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Abstract 
Risk assessment and risk matrices are powered tools used in risk management and help guide in the process of 
decision-making in organisations. Nevertheless, risk matrices have their own weaknesses and strengths. This paper 
provides a critical overview of the development and use of risk matrices in different field with an example of the 
risk matrix used by the National Health Service (NHS) in England. Risk matrices are helpful tools for risk 
assessment as they use quantitative measures to ensure consistent method of determining risk but organisations 
should adjust the design and size of risk matrices to suit their needs.   
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1. Introduction 
All over the world, nations and organisations are 
attempting to reduce risks, to improve safety and to 
extend lives. Indeed risk reduction has become a 
principle goal of modern governments and almost in 
every organisation. It is obvious that people, including 
government officials, often lack risk-related 
information. They often know little about the nature and 
magnitude of the risks at issue, and they often know 
little about the various consequences of risk reduction 
(Sunstein, 2002).  
Since risk cannot be eliminated, the main problems 
people face, individually and collectively, are how 
much risk they should live with and how they should go 
about managing the risk. If a set of strategies have been 
chosen that will allow the abatement of a particular risk, 
the question of what level of risk should be chosen 
arises.  If abating the risk costs nothing, the obvious 
answer is zero, get rid of the risk. But risk abatement 
almost always does cost money and time (Glickman and 
Gough, 1990). 
To answer these questions, analytical tools and risk 
ranking schemes must be used to distinguish lower risk 
activities / incidents from higher risk activities / 
incidents. One of the risk ranking methodologies is 
known as the risk assessment matrix. 
2. Risk Management 
Risk management is the process of assessing risks and 
taking steps to either eliminate or to reduce them (as far 
as is reasonably practicable) by introducing control 
measures. Risk management refers to the process of 
reducing the risks to a level deemed tolerable by society 
and to assure control, monitoring, and public 
communication (Morgan, 1990). 
There are more questions than answers when people talk 
about risks. The career of the term ‘risk’ is a rather 
recent phenomenon, however (Fischhoff et al., 1984), 
states that, “risk has always been part of human 
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quantitative instruments in which hazards are first 
identified and then allocated to a box on a two-
dimensional grid for which one axis measures the 
likelihood of a specific incident and the other the 
potential severity of consequences. 
 
The issues identified by Cox are certainly not confined 
to the United States, and indeed usage of risk matrices 
has spread in the United Kingdom and Europe from 
industry to all manner of public and private agencies 
ranging from hospitals to small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, local and central government bodies, and 
professional institutions 
 
4.1. Risk assessment matrix  
A common method used for risk ranking utilises risk 
matrices; these are typically 4x4 or 5x5 matrices, having 
event consequences along one axis and event frequency 
along the other. Each block on the risk matrix represents 
some level of risk, and blocks presenting similar risk are 
often grouped together into one of four or five risk 
regions (Altenbach&Brereton, 1998)  
Risk matrix is defined as “a mechanism to characterise 
and rank process risks that are typically identified 
through one or more multifunctional reviews (e.g. 
process hazard analysis, audits, or incident 
investigation” (Markowski and Mannan, 2008), and is 
also defined by Cox (2008) as “a table that has several 
categories of “probability,” “likelihood,” or “frequency” 
for its rows (or columns) and several categories of 
“severity,” “impact,” or “consequences” for its columns 
(or rows, respectively)”. 
 
In most cases, the frequency axis of the matrix has 
numerical values associated with it, typically spanning 
several orders of magnitude. Often, the consequence 
axis is based on a qualitative scale, where consequences 
are judgment based. However, the consequence scale 
generally has implicit quantitative values associated 
with it, which may or may not be recognised. Risk 
regions are often arbitrarily assigned (or assigned on the 
basis of symmetry). This presents a problem in that if 
the blocks of the risk matrix are incorrectly grouped, 
then incorrect conclusions can be drawn about the 
relative risk presented by events at a facility (Woodruff, 
2005).Three types of risk matrices are commonly used 
for risk ranking. A purely qualitative risk matrix will 
have its blocks defined in descriptive or qualitative 
terms. A purely quantitative risk matrix has its blocks 
defined in measurable or quantitative terms. Relative or 
absolute numerical scales are used on quantitative 
matrices, whereas scales on qualitative matrices are 
relative but not numerical. The third type of risk matrix 
is a hybrid: a semi-quantitative matrix with one scale 
(usually frequency) expressed quantitatively, while the 
other scale is expressed qualitatively (Emblemsvag and 
Kjølstad, 2006).iNTeg-Risk (2008) clearly states the 
importance of using scoring systems in risk assessment 
and management which generally requires the 
application of specific scores or scales. They highlight 
that in practical use, conventions such as using 5x5 risk 
matrices and/or a colour-code can be beneficial 
4.1.1.Qualitative risk matrix 
The qualitative risk matrix is basically task and or 
hazard analysis with some relative judgments made in 
order to categorise the hazards. When the 3x3 matrix is 
used, both the frequency and consequence of each 
accident scenario are then estimated on simple relative 
scales, such as low, medium and high. The risk for each 
scenarios is the product of the frequency rating and 
consequence rating, this indicates that the qualitative 
risk in this case falls into nine distinct regions or 
frequency x consequence pairs: Low x Low, Low x 
Medium, Low x High, Medium x Low, Medium x 
Medium, Medium x High, High x Low, High x 
Medium, High x High. Clearly Low x Low region has 
the lowest risk, while the High x High region has the 
highest risk. The intermediate regions are more difficult 
to interpret because some regions are directly 
comparable and others are not (Altenbach, 1995) 
In the Environmental Protection Agency in the USA 
(EPA) technical guidance for hazards analysis adapted 
by DOE-STD-3009-94, the risk levels from the 3 by 3 
matrix are grouped into three categories: High (Major 
Concern), Medium (Concern) and Low (No Concern), 
as indicated in the Figure.1 below, and also Table 1 
shows the risk groupings from the EPA. 
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very useful for distinguishing qualitatively between the 
most urgent and least urgent risks in many settings and 
are certainly much better than doing nothing, for 
example, than purely random decision making. 
Donoghue (2001) also supports the idea that, the risk 
assessment matrices are effective tools in making 
decisions in regard to the control of occupational health 
risks. He states that, the control measures can be applied 
in an iterative fashion until the risk has been reduced to 
an acceptable residual.  
 
The imagery of risk matrices is powerful, which may, 
along with their alleged and apparent simplicity, explain 
their popularity among agencies that are responsible for 
mainly lesser hazards,1 and therefore are likely less 
qualified in risk, but who nonetheless feel the need to be 
seen to be proactive in managing risk. Inter alia, and as 
observed, though not sanctioned, in the new 
international guidance on risk assessment (ISO 31010), 
it is said that matrices are also widely used to determine 
if a risk posed by a given hazard is or is not acceptable. 
Ball and Watt (2013) also concur with Cox (2008) that 
one of the leading arguments in support of risk matrices, 
which is that they are simple to use and transparent, is 
false. As determined here, all positionings of hazards on 
the matrix are subject to innumerable considerations, 
some of which even the rater may not be wholly aware. 
Yet, and it is another serious matter, requisite 
explanations and justifications are seldom, if ever, 
attempted. 
 
It is this latter issue, of the consistency of use of risk 
matrices as applied to what are normally seen as 
beyond-the-workplace hazards. A growing number of 
authors, highly experienced in risk assessment, have 
questioned or had cause to investigate alleged 
shortcomings of risk matrices, mainly on technical 
grounds. In addition, standards-setting institutions have 
warned of the potential for subjectivity and 
inconsistencyas have researchers in occupational safety 
(Ball and Watt, 2013). 
7. Conclusion  
Risk assessment and risk management techniques are 
being developed in many fields as an aid to safety 
investment decision making. Expanding responsibilities 
and limited resources compel policy makers to make 
difficult choices about the prioritisation of risk 
reduction measure and what safety standards to aim for. 
The need for mechanisms to help policy makers set 
priorities has been increasingly felt, and during the last 
few decades techniques of risk assessment and 
philosophies of optimisation have been developed. 
Risk matrices are very effective and widely used tool in 
making and improving risk management decisions, 
however the question of how ideally risk matrices 
should be constructed to improve risk management 
decisions is ongoing. It is not easy to answer, because 
risk matrices are typically used as only one component 
in informing eventual risk management decisions and 
also because their performance depends on the joint 
distribution of the two attributes probability and 
consequence.  
A risk matrix can be a useful tool to present the results 
of simplified risk analysis, helping one to gain insight 
into the relative risk of various scenarios that might be 
encountered in a given system. When developed 
quantitatively with axes constructed to be relevant to the 
facility and operations being studied, risk evolutions can 
be defined logically. Logic based risk evaluations can 
facilitate management decisions such as the 
authorisation of operations. It can also help optimise 
resources by showing where to concentrate efforts for 
more detailed analysis or for risk reduction activities.  
Using 3x3, 4x4 or 5x5 matrix, will be useful to some 
organisations and might not be for others i.e. when 5x5 
matrix is used, the matrix will have 25 blocks (risk 
grades), the more blocks for representation, the more 
likelihood of the risk matrix producing different levels 
which would produce more risk ranking grades. 
Therefore, organisations would be able to allocate the 
low, moderate, high and extreme risk groups to the 
appropriate levels of responsibilities within the 
organisations. The wider options for the probability and 
consequence scores on a risk matrix should give more 
scope to differentiate within the risk group the 
probability of a certain risk occurring and the 
consequence of the risk occurring within the low, 
moderate, high and extreme groups for the different 
levels of responsibility. whereas by having 3x3 matrix, 
there will be only 9 blocks for the risk grades, which in 
some cases might not be useful when making decisions 
or allocating resources. 
However, if the descriptions of the consequence and 
likelihood scores are difficult to classify then the scores 
cannot always be well interpreted. For example, Table 1 
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(appendix 1 NHS Risk Matrix), where it shows the 
consequence scores, by looking at the column where it 
says; Service Business Interruption; the difference 
between Major and Catastrophic scores; Catastrophic 
score leads the Business to a permanent loss of the 
business while Major score can only cause the business 
to be interrupted for one week. In such a case, the 
extreme description should be more than one week and 
permanent loss. 
Cox (2009) argues that risk priority scoring systems, 
although widely used (and even required in many 
current regulations and standards), ignore essential 
information about correlations among risks. This 
information typically consists of noting common 
elements across multiple targets (e.g., common 
vulnerabilities).These common features induce 
common, or strongly positively correlated, uncertainties 
about the effectiveness of different risk-reducing 
measures. It is easy to use this information, in 
conjunction with well-known decision analysis and 
optimization techniques, to develop more valuable risk 
reduction strategies, for any given risk management 
budget, than can be expressed by a priority list. Thus, 
there appears to be abundant opportunity to improve the 
productivity of current risk-reducing efforts in many 
important applications using already well-understood 
optimization methods.To sum up, risk matrices are a 
useful way of ranking risks, but organisations should 
adjust the design and size of risk matrices to suit their 
needs. 
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Table 2. The Consequence scores used by the (National Patient Safety Agency in England)
 
Table 3. The Likelihood scores 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Descriptor Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Almost certain 
Frequency  Not expected to 
occur for years. 
Expected to occur at 
least annually. 
Expected to occur at 
least monthly. 
Expected to occur at 
least weekly. 
Expected to occur at 
least daily. 
  <1% 1-5% 6-20% 21-50% >50% 
Probability Will occur in 
exceptional 
circumstances. 
Unlikely to occur. Reasonable chance 
of occurring. 
Likely to occur. More likely to occur 
than not. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Descriptor Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
Objectives / 
Projects  
Insignificant cost 
increase/schedule 
slippage. Barely 
noticeable reduction in 
scope or quality 
<5% over 
budget/schedule 
slippage. Minor 
reduction in 
quality/scope 
5-10% over 
budge/schedule 
slippage. Reduction 
in scope or quality 
10-25% over 
budget/schedule 
slippage. Does not 
meet secondary 
objectives 
>25% over 
budget/schedule 
slippage. Does not 
meet primary 
objectives 
Injury 
Minor injury not 
requiring first aid 
Minor injury or 
illness, first aid 
treatment needed 
RIDDOR/Agency 
reportable 
Major injuries or 
long 
incapacity/disability 
(loss of limb) 
Death or major 
permanent 
incapacity  
Patient 
experience 
Unsatisfactory patient 
experience not directly 
related to patient care 
Unsatisfactory 
patient experience – 
readily resolvable  
Mismanagement of 
patient care. 
Serious 
mismanagement of 
patient care 
Totally 
unsatisfactory 
patient outcome or 
experience 
Complaint/Cla
ims 
Locally resolved  Justified complaint 
peripheral to clinical 
care 
Below excess claim. 
Justified complaint  
involving lack of 
appropriate care 
Claim above excess 
level. Multiple 
justified complaints 
Multiple claims or 
single major claim 
Service 
business 
interruption 
Loss/interruption > 1 
hour 
Loss/interruption >8 
hours 
Loss/interruption >1 
day 
Loss/interruption >1 
week 
Permanent loss of 
service of facility 
Staffing & 
competence 
Short-term low staffing 
level temporarily reduces 
service quality (< 1 day) 
Ongoing low 
staffing level 
reduces service 
quality 
Late delivery of key 
objective/service 
due to lack of staff. 
Minor error due to 
poor training. 
Ongoing unsafe 
staffing level. 
Uncertain delivery 
of key 
objective/service 
due to lack of staff. 
Serious error due to 
poor training 
Non-delivery of key 
objective/service 
due to lack of staff. 
Loss of key staff. 
Critical error due to 
insufficient training 
Financial Small loss Loss >0.1% of budget
Loss >0.25% of 
budget
Loss>0.5 of budget Loss >1% of budget 
Inspection/aud
it 
Minor recommendations 
Minor Non-compliance 
with standards 
Recommendations 
given. Non-
compliance with 
standards 
Reducing rating. 
Challenging 
recommendations. 
Non-compliance 
with core standards 
Enforcement 
Action. Low rating. 
Critical report. 
Major non-
compliance with 
core standards 
Prosecution. Zero 
rating. Severely 
critical report 
Adverse 
publicity/reput
ation 
Rumours Local media – short 
term. Minor effect 
on staff morale 
Local media – long 
term. Significant 
effect on staff 
morale 
National media <3 
days 
National Media >3 
days. MP concern 
(question in House 
of parliament)  
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